All political actions have a mixture of motives, and Macron’s approaches to Putin have been attributed to vanity, the insistence that the EU play a leading role, domestic politics, and the fear of nuclear escalation. Undoubtedly all this is present. But politicians also follow a scenario that was often written long ago. They do what one historian called “untold stories” – ideas about the world that are taken for granted in their political culture. While every Western politician should share Macron’s concerns about escalation and economic damage, his only insistence on reaching out to Putin follows a typical French scenario, the first drafts of which were written in the late 19th century. This scenario has profoundly affected European history. He can do it again. It is worth trying to understand. It begins with the traumatic defeat of France by Prussia in 1870-71, which created the Second German Reich. France had lost wars in the past, but always by a coalition of Great Powers, never before only one. Her armies had been defeated, her capital was besieged and they were starving to surrender. The impact in France was profound. The defeat inspired a massive national renaissance effort, which included the adoption of democratic democracy, a cult of militarism (including military exercises for children), aggressive imperialism, the introduction of English-style games in schools to inflate “taste” . attacks on “female” Catholicism, encouragement to have more children (failed, but still shaping France’s welfare policies) and an angry nationalism that some see as the origins of fascism. But none of this could be changed by the fact that the new Germany surpassed France in industrial power and birth rates. This is where Russia came in. What did Europe’s largest democracy and its most powerful empire have in common? Only one thing, but most importantly: the fear of Germany. They signed a military alliance, which formed the basis of their common security. In 1896, Tsar Nicholas II visited France and was met with applause, including many who had hitherto considered Russia an enemy and a threat. France, a wealthy country, has invested much of its savings in developing Russia, especially in railways, to transport Russian troops west quickly. This helped to create a fear of “encirclement” in Germany. Her answer was the Slifen Plan, to win a quick victory by invading France through Belgium while Russia was unprepared. The Franco-Russian alliance responded by accelerating its military mobilization plans to deter Germany. Then, in July 1914, disaster struck – the Schlieffen plan sparked a global conflict. French troops, dropped on the German border to help Russia, suffered the heaviest casualties in the entire war. The “Russian steamer” sailed heavily west, but stopped quickly. Four years of decay brought massacres, famines, revolutions, civil wars and a century of horror. But a Franco-Russian relationship revived. Still fearing Germany and not being able to rely on Britain or America, France recognized the USSR in 1924 and the French Republicans and Bolshevik revolutionaries signed a non-aggression pact as early as 1931. Moscow was initially unhappy when Hitler came to power in 1933, as Marxist theory dictated that it would be quickly overthrown by a proletarian revolution. When that did not happen, Moscow and Paris again sought mutual help. An agreement was signed in 1935 and the two countries provided assistance to the Popular Front government in Spain. The French tried to recruit the Soviet Union against Hitler. Chamberlain and Halifax dragged their feet, reluctant to trust Stalin. But the French were probably right that Soviet personal interest could lead to a common stance that would stop Hitler and most likely lead to his overthrow. World War II, at least in its form, may have been prevented or delayed. Instead, they were repulsed, the Soviets changed sides, signed an agreement with Hitler, and war broke out. World War II continues to inevitably mark the West as a whole and its collective memory, but in different ways. Although Britain supported the French resistance throughout, and France was liberated mainly from America and Britain, the memory that followed was shaped by Charles de Gaulle, France’s chief national screenwriter. De Gaulle resented being treated by the “Anglo-Saxons” – a concept he introduced into modern political vocabulary – and in 1942 thought of moving his headquarters to Moscow. In 1944, he signed an alliance with the USSR. Following his ouster, the fiercely Atlantic Fourth Republic was a co-founder of NATO. But when de Gaulle returned in 1958 and created the presidential Fifth Republic, his dissatisfaction with the Anglo-Saxons had not subsided. It re-cultivated the Russians, culminating in a state visit to Moscow in 1966, France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military command structure and the withdrawal of more than 60,000 US troops from French territory. Germany lurks in the background, divided and occupied, but revitalizing and potentially strong. De Gaulle’s response – imitated by all his successors – was to make outrageous gestures of reconciliation and friendship. This became the new “special relationship” of France and the core of its unwavering ambition to create an independent European Great Power. But the relationship with Germany, despite efforts on both sides, has never been really warm. France’s constant attempt to wrap Germany in a close embrace through EU integration is not without suspicion and concern. Thus, maintaining relations with Soviet Russia and then the Russian Federation has always been part of the picture. During the break-up of Yugoslavia, the French, including the army, tended to sympathize with the Serbs, Russia’s defenders. So how does this affect Macron’s current approach to Putin? At least since de Gaulle – and indeed from Carno – the leaders of France have adopted a realistic view of geopolitics. For de Gaulle, nations were historical entities, regardless of their political regimes or the weaknesses of their interim rulers. In the eyes of him and his successors, Russia is always Russia, necessary for the security of Europe and therefore of France. We can not trust the Americans and in any case they are likely to leave Europe. The British, as de Gaulle recorded, will always choose the “open sea” over the continent – a view confirmed by Brexit. Germany is big and unmanageable. Russia, Macron said, must become part of a European security structure: it can not be allowed to become a permanent enemy and ally of China again. In addition, France, like the United States and Britain, wants to focus more on the emerging Asia-Pacific. Thanks to the tough preservation of the scattered fragments of the empire (discreetly renamed “overseas departments” or “overseas territories” and therefore in some cases within the EU), France is the rightful owner of 11 million square kilometers of ocean-rich oceans. twice as much as Britain has. Macron has stated that while the power struggles of the 20th century took place on the continent, the key to the 21st century will be the sea. So Macron’s long and fruitless conversations with Putin, which are applauded by the French public, are much more than applause. Marin Le Pen on the right and Jean-Luc Melanson on the left are even more pro-Russian. The “unspeakable assumption” is that Russia must somehow remain within the European balance of power, with France, as in the past, its interlocutor and ideally its guide. Macron must therefore find the least that would satisfy Putin and try to reach an acceptable compromise to end a catastrophic war. Otherwise, the “Anglo-Saxons” – and the despised Boris Johnson – will be ready to fight to the last Ukrainian, while the Germans will roll for the sake of gas and oil. Where would this leave France’s ambitions for the EU, you ask? But if Russia can be persuaded to accept a settlement – that was the goal of the Minsk agreements – Macron can continue his relentless work to turn “sovereign Europe” into a world power, with France as a leading and world leader. representative. French diplomacy is playing a long game, with the national interest first. This, in general, is why France – unlike Britain or America – does not want to humiliate Russia.
